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Summary: Korean agriculture has been facing several structural problems 
resulting from rapid structural changes since 1960’s, some of which are 
preventing a smooth policy reform in accordance with the WTO regime. Political 
burden from rice monoculture, policy ineffectiveness from too large farm 
employment, and inflexibility in policy options from high dependency of farm 
household income on farm income are pointed out and discussed in detail. 
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1. Introduction  
Korean agriculture has experienced considerable structural changes along with economic 
development and policy reform in the process of trade liberalization. In the early 1960's, agricultural 
shares of GDP and total employment accounted for almost 50 and 60 percents respectively. It took 
only around four decades for the shares to fall to the current levels of 4.5 and 8 percents, each. Such 
rapid changes in Korea are regarded as a rare case in the world.  
Besides its rapid structural changes, another reason that Korean case attracts our concerns is that 
Korea is among the net food importing developing countries which in general maintain protective 
positions in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations. 
The purposes of this paper are to provide Korean experience in agricultural policy evolution and its 
structural consequences, and to infer some implications for future agricultural policy reform. To meet 
the purposes, this paper first examines how the major policies have evolved in Korean agriculture. 
The historical backgrounds, implications of the policies on Korean agriculture will be briefly 
investigated at this stage. Second, this paper reviews the current structural features of Korean 
agriculture resulting from the policies. And finally it suggests some implications for the future 
agricultural policy reform. 
 
2. Agricultural Policy Changes in Korea  
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2.1 Agricultural Policies at the Early Stage of Economic Development (Pre-1970's)  
During the time of early stage of economic development, all the government policies were targeted to 
achieve economic growth. Agricultural policy also had to be auxiliary to overall economic growth 
policy. At this time of high inflation caused by overall supply shortage in the economy, price 
stabilization was important precondition for economic growth and hence it was pursued as an 
important macroeconomic policy objective. In agriculture, therefore, government tried to maintain 
agricultural prices, particularly rice price, as low as possible. 
2.1.1 Low Grain Price Policies 
During 1960’s rice as a single commodity had taken very large weights in consumer price index, 
accounting for around 200 out of total weights, 1000. In this context, it was believed that low rice 
price would help improve competitiveness in the economy by lowering wage rates. The purchase 
price for rice, according to the Grain Management Law enacted in 1950, used to be set very low, 
sometimes even lower than production cost at the very beginning stage of economic development in 
early 1960's. 
2.1.2 PL 480  
With the disincentive low grain price policy, combined with poor agricultural infrastructure, domestic 
food had always been in short supply. Foreign aid from abroad was one way to solve the serious 
supply shortage problem in the short run. In this period, the grain imports by the U.S. PL480 
program(1956-1970) had greatly contributed not only to relieving food shortage but to inflation 
control, and hence to social stability and economic growth.     
The items imported under the PL480 program were mainly cotton and grains such as wheat, barley 
except for rice. However, the continuous surge of PL480 items has brought about the structural 
vulnerability of domestic production basis for those products. In this context, the PL480 program had 
served as an opportunity for the Korean agricultural structure to be centered on rice farming system. 
However, the Japanese colonial policy(1910-1945) is generally regarded as the most important 
momentum for forming the current rice-dominant farming system. Korea under the Japanese colony 
was forced to serve as a supplier of staple food, mainly rice, to Japan. Thus, the Japanese colonial 
agricultural policy had been targeted to enhance rice production through the skewed investment 
toward rice production.  
2.1.3 Land Reform  
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Land reform program was implemented in order to establish modern land ownership system by 
enacting Land Reform Act in 1949. The long-lasting tenant system was abolished so that farmers 
could have ownership for the land where they had been cultivating. Farmers only could own the 
arable land. At the same time, the law restricted the maximum farm size to 3 hectares, and prohibited 
renting or leasing of farmland. Although the restriction on farm size was the reflection of the socio-
economic condition aiming at equitable distribution of land, such land reform brought about 
efficiency problem by having built the small scale farming structure in Korean agriculture.    
2.2 Protective Agricultural Policies (1970's - 1980's)  
From late 1960’s, the disincentive agricultural price policy had been seriously challenged. In the 
process of economic development, the gaps between agriculture and manufacturing sector, and rural 
and urban areas had been continuously expanded due mainly to the rapid industrialization and 
urbanization. Large migration and exodus from rural area entailed. Domestic production slowed down, 
and hence could not meet the rapidly increasing food demand.  
Now policies that not only support farm income but also increase production were necessary. The 
goals of agricultural policy in this period were, therefore, to support producer income, to achieve self-
sufficiency in food, and to maintain balanced development between rural and urban areas including 
the improvement of rural living environment.  
2.2.1 Two-tier Price Scheme (Government Purchase Program)  
With the low purchase prices before 1970's, farmers had been discouraged to increase rice production. 
Government also failed to secure the sufficient quantity necessary for stabilizing prices or other 
policy objectives. In 1968, Korea abandoned the low rice price policy, and instead in 1970 the 
government introduced the two-tier price scheme. The main objective of this policy is to protect both 
the producers and consumers.  
2.2.2 Productivity Enhancement Programs  
Small sized farmland per household, irregular shape of paddy fields, poor conditions of farm road, 
irrigation and drainage systems, and fragmentation of holdings have been the most frequently 
mentioned features on Korean farm land. To support large population with small and poor 
conditioned farmland, productivity-enhancing policies were implemented focusing on agricultural 
infrastructure improvement such as farm size enlargement, readjustment of arable land, development 
of water resource, improvement of drainage and irrigation system. 
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The government agency (Rural Development Corporation) converted the farming type from non-
farmer landowners, retiring farmers, and part-time farmers into full-time farmers or agricultural 
corporations using various ways such as purchase and resale, lease and sublease, and loans. Also, 
rearrangement and exchange of plots between neighboring farmers have been strongly encouraged by 
the government to consolidate scattered land for production efficiency.  
To prevent reduction in arable land in the process of industrialization and urbanization, all arable land 
available were classified into two different types, i.e. ‘absolute arable land’ and ‘relative arable land’. 
The absolute arable land was not allowed to be used for any purposes other than agricultural 
production.  
2.2.3 New Technology Adoption  
Early in the 1970's, high yielding rice variety named as Tong-il Rice was developed and its 
cultivation was highly encouraged by the government in pursuit of rice self-sufficiency. The 
development and nationwide spread of high yield rice variety played a significant role in increasing 
domestic rice production, and hence achieving self-sufficiency in staple food. Production of Tong-il 
Rice had been sharply increased up to 1978, thereafter it had continuously declined and in 1991 
completely disappeared because it could not satisfy Korean consumers taste.  
Despite the technological innovation of developing HYV, it had some limitation in that its innovation 
and adoption were initiated by the government rather than induced from farmers for the purpose of 
achieving rice self-sufficiency. Hence, after the rice self-sufficiency objective was achieved in 1991, 
attempts for further innovation of HYV were not actively made.  
2.3 Toward Market Oriented Agricultural Policies (Since late 1980's)  
Although Korea continued to pursue import liberalization since the end of 1970's, Korean agricultural 
markets still remained highly protective, judging from international standard. However, the 
environment surrounding Korean agriculture has dramatically changed since late 1980's, domestically 
and internationally. Having faced strong pressure internationally to lower import barriers substantially, 
Korea had no choice but to change fundamental agricultural policy toward being more market 
oriented. Indeed, the UR was the key force that made Korean agriculture move forward rapidly. The 
primary policy goal was to enhance the competitiveness for agricultural products by improving 
efficiency. Agricultural restructuring and readjustment were strongly required.  
2.3.1 Modification Envisioned for Long-lasting Domestic Support Program  
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There have appeared a couple of factors that have required changes in domestic support program. 
According to the AMS(Aggregate Measurement of Support) reduction commitment in WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, the quantity and/or price of rice are subject to reduction. Also, a serious 
rice surplus problem is expected due mainly to the high level of rice productivity and continuously 
decreasing trend of per capita rice consumption. In this circumstance, the domestic policy of 
government purchasing program needs to be changed in such a direction as reducing government 
intervention and recovering market forces.  
2.3.2 Direct Payment Programs  
With the launch of WTO in 1995, Korea's agricultural policy seemed to change more rapidly toward 
market orientation. Direct payment program began to be introduced although it is not completely in 
conformity with the Green Box category of the Agreement on Agriculture. Environmental aspect of 
agriculture was also emphasized for the purpose of pursuing sustainable agriculture and 
environmentally friendly agriculture. Among the direct payment programs newly developed so far are 
payment for producer retirement, payment for environmental program, and payment for preserving 
rice paddy field, some of which are of the nature of Green Box policy others not. Korean agricultural 
policy is now transforming from market intervention policy to direct payment and government service 
which are permitted under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture as Green Box.  
2.3.3 Further Land Reform  
As time goes by, the small farm size has long been regarded as an obstacle to increase the efficiency 
in agricultural sector. As a result, the Land Reform Act was first revised in 1994 and further in 1996 
and was finally replaced by Farmland Act enacted in 1996. In the Farmland Act of 1996, the limit on 
farm size was rescinded in the specially designated area for agricultural development, the Agricultural 
Promotion Zone which covers 61.2 percent of total farmland. The upper limit of land ownership was 
enlarged up to 10 hectares, and marginal land in productivity was permitted to change its use for non-
agricultural purpose. It was also made possible for agricultural corporations to own farmland.  
2.3.4 Agricultural Investment and Loan Program  
In 1992 when the UR negotiation was about to be finalized, the Korean government decided to 
implement a large scaled 'Agricultural Investment and Loan Program' in order to cope with the 
coming agricultural market opening through the improvement of agricultural production structure. 
Since then government budget has been dramatically increased for that program.  
Total fund of 42 trillion won was appropriated for the program during the period of 1992 to 1998. 
Additional 45 trillion won was earmarked to extend the program until 2004. This enormous fund was 
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invested in such projects as mechanization, readjustment of arable land, water resource development, 
agricultural facilities modernization, enlargement of farming size, technological development, 
bringing up of the elite farmers group, improvement of marketing structure, diversification of income 
sources, and improvement of rural life environment and welfare.    
However, the effectiveness of the agricultural budget outlay has not been evaluated as successful. 
Considerable amount of the budget was not used for the actual investment or loan purposes, but 
instead for the compensation for past policy failure.  
3. Structural Consequences of Agricultural Policies 
 
3.1 Rice-dominant Farming System  
 
Rice takes dominant positions in both agricultural production and food consumption in Korea. In 
2002, 1,138 thousand hectares (61%) out of total cultivated land area of 1,862 thousand hectares were 
allocated to rice farming. According to 2000 agricultural census, 787,451 households (57%) out of 
1,383,468 farm households are cultivating paddy rice of which 512,158 households are producing rice 
on full-time base.  
 
Table 1: Rice Farming as a Major Income Source 
Ratio (%)  
Year 
Farm household 
income (A) 
(thousand won) 
Income from 
farming (B) 
(thousand won) 
Income from rice 
farming (C) 
(thousand won) 
C/A C/B 
1970 256 194 88 34.4 45.4
1980 2,693 1,755 741 27.5 42.2
1990 11,026 6,264 3,097 28.1 49.4
1995 21,803 10,469 3,984 18.3 38.1
2000 23,072 10,897 5,671 24.6 52.0
2001 23,907 11,267 6,051 25.3 53.7
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,『Major Statistics on Agriculture』, 2002. 
 
Consequently, rice, as a single commodity, accounts for 33 percent of total agricultural production 
values, and 54 percent of average farm income per farm household. In addition, about 32 % of per 
capita energy daily required is provided by rice. The rice dominant diet and agricultural production 
pattern have been formed from ancient times mainly due to the climate factor resulting from the 
geographical location in the Asian monsoon climate zone. 
 
Table 2: Producer Support Estimates for Korea  
      PSE(bil. Won) Share(%) 
Year 1986-88 2002 1986-88 2002 
Total PSE 9,675 22,655 100 100.0 
Rice 4,541 8,268 46.9 36.5 
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Beef and veal 508 1,378 5.3 6.1 
Milk 328 1,134 3.4 5.0 
Pig meat 311 924 3.2 4.1 
Source: OECD PSE data base. 
 
In this context, rice inevitably has taken the central position in government policies for a long time. 
Even in the UR negotiations, rice was excepted from ‘tariffication’. As a result, rice is the only 
product under quantity restriction now. Moreover, if we see the government support in terms of 
Producer Support Estimate(PSE) in 2002, more than one third of Korea's total PSE are attributable to 
rice.  
 
3.2 Large Farm Employment with Small Farm Size  
 
The Korean government has pursued policies, for a long time, of expanding farm size to improve 
production efficiency. The number of farm households with farm size larger than 3 hectares continued 
to increase while that of other smaller sized farm households has decreased. The government's efforts 
seem to be partly rewarded, though not enough. Combined with these policy effects, the severe 
competition after UR might also have made some contributions to the expansion of large sized farm 
households. However, we should note that the number of farm less than 1 hectare is still dominant 
with over 60 per cent of total farm households. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Farm Households by Farm Size (unit: households)  
  1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002 
≤ 0.5 ha 815,344 775,234 611,698 482,703 432,982 454,775 432,802 
0.5 ~ 1.0ha 837,414 824,994 747,579 544,457 432,107 378,655 344,256 
1.0 ~ 3.0ha 656,837 763,312 736,756 672,537 541,293 465,324 405,402 
3.0 ha ≤ 19,533 37,670 31,630 43,533 70,445 84,714 78,086 
average per 
household(ha) 0.900 0.925 1.018 1.194 1.323 1.365 1.454 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 『Agricultural Census』, 1960 -2000, 『Major Statistics on 
Agriculture』, 2002.  
   
The ultimate limitation to farm size expansion seems to be the large farm employment. Despite the 
rapid decrease in farm population over last four decades, too large population is still employed in 
agricultural sector. The number of Korean farmers is almost the same as the total number of Germany, 
France, and UK combined. The implications of large farm employment for policy reform will be 
discussed later. 
 
Table 4: Populations, Employments, Arable Land per Farmer, and International Comparison of Time 
Required for Structural Changes  
ag. share of GDP ag. Share of employment 
Countries 
Total 
population 
(2000) 
(thousand) 
agricultural 
employment 
(2000) 
(thousand) 
arable 
land per
farmer 
(ha) 
(2000)
year of 
being at 
40% 
year of 
being at 
7% 
years 
required
year of 
being at 
40% 
year of being 
at 16% 
years   
required 
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UK 59,634 537 10.9 1788 1901 113 1800 1868 68
Netherlands 15,864 248 3.7 1800 1965 165 1855 1957 102
USA 283,230 3,027 58.5 1854 1950 96 1897 1950 53
Germany 82,017 1,013 11.7 1866 1958 92 1900 1942 42
Denmark 5,320 111 20.5 1850 1969 119 1920 1962 42
France 59,238 899 20.5 1878 1972 94 1921 1965 44
Japan 127,096 2,769 1.6 1896 1969 73 1940 1971 31
Korea 47,275 2,288 0.8 1965 1991 26 1977 1991 14
Source: OECD data base and Lee(1997) 
3.3 Overflow of Aged Farm Labors  
 
The rapid structural changes mainly due to the fast overall economic growth for last four decades as 
indicated in the Table 4 have led to serious ‘growth fatigues’ in agricultural sector. One of the fatigue 
symptoms lies in the overflow of old farmers. Currently, almost 50 per cent of total Korean farmers 
are 60 years old and above. 
 
In the early stage of economic development, large out-migration of agricultural labors, in particular 
the labors with high productivity, has been supported by dual economic development theories. It had 
been true for Korea through 1970s. However, in Korea, since the early 1980s the migration has not 
been supported as the most important factor for the rapid drop of farm labor. Rather, the natural exits 
by death or retirement have largely contributed to the decrease of farm labors. On the other hand, the 
relative employment expansion of non-farm sector has been largely supplemented not by migration 
from rural sector but by new young entrants(Lee(1997)). This implies that the rural old aged labors 
have become factors specific to agriculture which have very limited mobility between agriculture and 
other sectors.   
 
The dominant role of natural factors like death or retirement in the reduction of farm labor has very 
important implications for the aging process of farm labor. The rates of death or retirement are 
relatively stable and are likely to be independent of the changes in agricultural share of total economy. 
Under the time of rapid shrink of agricultural share in the economy, stable exit rates of the aged 
labors may cause the overflow of the aged labors, which in turn hinders young labors from entering 
agriculture. The speed of aging process in this case is highly related with that of shrinking process of 
agricultural share. The policy implication of this case will be discussed in detail later.  
 
3.4 Deterioration of Agricultural Terms of Trade 
 
From the early 1990s, right before the implementation of WTO agreements and afterward, the slight 
increase in average price received by farmers is attributed to the grain sector, especially rice which 
has been under government price support programs. The increase in rice price was substantial even 
after the Uruguay Round. Without grain price increases the average price for the agricultural products 
would definitely have declined as usual. However, the prices for vegetable, fruits, livestock animal, 
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which are also important income sources for Korean farmers, have shown sharp declines or 
fluctuations. 
 
Input prices used for agricultural production have increased relatively fast. Especially, the prices for 
fertilizer, pesticide, farming machinery, and wage have increased as mush as approximately 50 
percent after 1995. As a result, the terms of trade, defined as the ratio of the prices received by 
farmers to the prices paid by farmers, have been deteriorated after 1995, falling down to 83.5 in 2001. 
It would be rather natural that prices for agricultural products fall as import liberalization proceeds. 
But the input prices are expected to continuously increase due mainly to the imperfect market 
structure, and hence the falling trend of the terms of trade does not seem to be reversed in the near 
future.  
Table 5: Price Indexes Received and Paid by Farmers, and Terms of Trade 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Price Indexes Received 84.5 84.7 91.7 100.0 105.2 102.2 101.9 108.5 109.6 116.4 
   Rice 84.9 89.1 91.5 100.0 114.9 116.7 124.5 131.4 137.8 135.3 
   Barley 90.7 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 105.5 110.7 115.2 119.8 
   Soybean 69.3 78.4 86.3 100.0 103.9 102.7 111.3 142.8 136.0 122.8 
   Vegetable 80.7 79.9 88.9 100.0 104.6 103.1 105.2 95.7 94.8 106.1 
   Fruits 65.8 66.4 93.5 100.0 92.5 93.9 93.4 102.0 80.3 61.7 
   Livestock(Animal) 96.2 88.4 91.0 100.0 100.2 88.3 76.7 96.6 101.1 121.0 
   Flower 66.0 78.4 83.2 100.0 90.1 93.8 102.6 113.0 95.7 91.2 
Price Indexes Paid 90.2 90.9 94.4 100.0 104.3 106.7 118.0 121.2 127.5 139.4 
   Fertilizer 95.7 96.9 96.9 100.0 100.3 105.8 149.7 149.6 149.6 149.9 
   Pesticide 95.5 97.9 99.0 100.0 103.7 108.0 140.0 130.7 129.4 132.6 
   Farming Machinery 130.7 100.6 99.0 100.0 101.6 104.2 153.4 153.8 154.0 154.2 
   Feed 94.8 95.4 95.6 100.0 104.8 110.5 136.4 109.3 104.8 117.6 
   Wage Rates 85.4 90.5 93.6 100.0 109.7 116.5 110.5 124.2 140.8 149.1 
Terms of Trade 93.7 93.2 97.1 100.0 100.9 95.8 86.4 89.5 86.0 83.5 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 『Major Statistics on Agriculture』, 2002.  
 
3.5 Expansion of Income Disparity 
 
There was a big change in farm and farm household income growth pattern about the time of 1995. 
Before 1995 both farm and farm household income grew at two digit annual growth rates. However, 
the growth rates have begun to seriously decline since 1995. In fact, the growth rates of farm and 
farm household incomes even took some negative values in 1997 and 1998. Considering that the 
number of farm household has been decreasing at 3 percent annually on average, the stagnation of 
farm and farm household income has been even more serious. Several factors might be responsible 
for such a serious stagnation of farm and farm household income. Market opening due to the UR, and 
financial crisis in 1997 might be the most influential factors. The most sudden drop to negative 
growth rates in 1998 might be due to the financial crisis.  
 
Table 6: Changes in Farm Household and Farm Income 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
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Farm Household Income (A) 
(1000 won) 
16,928 
(16.7) 
20,316 
(20.0) 
21,803 
(7.3) 
23,298 
(6.9) 
23,488 
(0.8) 
20,494 
(-12.7) 
22,323 
(8.9) 
23,072(3
.4) 
23,907 
(3.6) 
Farm Income(B) 
(1000 won) 
8,427 
(14.6) 
10,325 
(22.5) 
10,469 
(1.4) 
10,837 
(3.5) 
10,204 
(-5.8) 
8,955 
(-12.2) 
10,566 
(18.0) 
10,897(3
.1) 
11,267 
(3.4) 
B/A(%) 49.8 50.8 48.0 46.5 43.4 43.7 47.3 47.2 47.1 
Urban Household Income (C) 17,734 (1000 won) 20,416 22,933 25,832 27,448 25,597 26,697 28,643 31,501 
A/C(%) 95.5 99.5 95.1 90.2 85.6 80.1 83.6 80.6 75.9 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are annual growth rates(%).  
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,『Major Statistics on Agriculture』, 2002.  
 
The stagnation of Korean farm household income is also clearly identified by comparing it with the 
urban income. Since the late 1980s the farm household income has lagged behind the urban income. 
However, the gap continued to further widen after 1995. In 2001, the farm household income fell to 
76 percent of urban household income. Under the continuing deterioration of agricultural terms of 
trade, off-farm income might contribute to narrowing the gap between rural and urban household 
income. However, in Korea its contribution is limited because, despite several political efforts for a 
long time, Korea still has relatively high dependency on farm income compared with other Asian 
countries of similar agricultural structure.  
 
Table 7: Share of Off-Farm Income in Farm Household Income 
Korea Japan Taiwan USA year A B A B A B A B 
1985 5,736 2,037(35.5) 6,916 5,850(84.6) 310.6 233.7(78.2) - -
1990 11,026 4,762(43.2) 8,399 7,235(86.2) 503.8 402.9(79.9) 39,007 33,265(85.3)
1995 21,803 11,334(52.0) 8,917 7,474(83.8) 871.1 699.0(80.2) 44,392 39,671(89.4)
2000 23,072 12,175(52.8) 8,280 7,176(86.9) 917.6 756.5(82.4) 62,019 59,228(95.5)
2001 23,907 12,640(52.9) 8,022 6,988(87.1) 881.3 718.1(81.5) 64,465 58,894(91.4)
A=farm household income  
B=off-farm income(transfer income included)  
Numbers in (  ) are the ratio of B to A (%)  
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,『Major Statistics on Agriculture』, 2002.  
 
4. Implications for the Future Policy Reform 
 
4.1 Current Structure of Agricultural Support Policy 
 
Korean agriculture is characterized by high level of government support. Although the percentage 
producer support estimate(%PSE), the government support share of total farm receipts, fell from 75% 
in 1990 to 66% in 2002, it is still double the OECD average (OECD 2003).  
 
Table 8: Structure of PSE (unit: billion won) 
Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE) Year  
Total PSE % PSE 
Market price 
support 
Payments based 
on area 
planted/animal 
numbers 
Payments 
based on input 
use 
Payments 
based on 
input 
constraints 
Payments based on 
overall farming 
income 
1986 8,362  66 8,315(99.4) 0  32(0.4)  0  15(0.2)  
1990 13,729  75 13,207(96.2) 0  260(1.9)  9(0.1)  252(1.8)  
1995 19,442  72 18,406(94.7) 12(0.1)  725(3.7)  60(0.3)  239(1.2)  
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2000 22,018  67 21,057(95.6) 21(0.1)  553(2.5)  27(0.1)  359(1.6)  
2002 22,655  66 20,649(91.1) 445(2.0)  793(3.5)  21(0.1)  747(3.3)  
Numbers in (  ) are the share of market price support or each payment in total PSE. 
Source: OECD PSE/CSE database, 2003. 
 
The producer support estimate(PSE) consists mainly of market price support (MPS)  through 
domestic and trade policy measures. Even though the share of MPS is on the decreasing trend, it is 
still about 91 per cent of total PSE in 2002. The remaining 9 per cent is accounted for by the support 
through budgetary payments. However, about two thirds of the total budgetary payments are 
performed in the form of supports based on input use and production scale which have been proved to 
be the most production and trade distorting measures. 
 
The MPS has been the most powerful and easy measure for the Korean government to adopt in order 
to pursue multiple agricultural policy objectives simultaneously with limited budget.  Korea, without 
clearly specifying the individual agricultural policy objective, has adopted the MPS as a policy 
instrument aimed at agriculture, farmers, and rural area simultaneously, expecting that increasing 
agricultural production through price supports could vitalize rural area as well as improve farmers' 
income. 
 
4.2 Directions for Future Policy Reform 
 
The Korean key policy instruments based on MPS are grouped into a policy category to be subject to 
reform in the ongoing WTO multilateral trade negotiation. Following this international trend, many 
discussions on the directions for future policy reform are underway within the Korean government. 
The major points of the discussions can be summarized as in Table 9. 
Table 9: Future Policy Structure under Consideration 
   ․For agriculture → Industrial policy 
        - market orientation, competitiveness 
        - pro-environment and high quality products 
    ․For farmers → Income policy 
        - expansion of direct payment 
        - increase in off-farm income 
        - enhancement of income safety net 
   ․For rural areas → Community development policy 
        - rural community as an amenable living space 
        - expansion of welfare infrastructure 
        - enhancement of social safety net 
 
4.3 Limitations for Policy Reform     
 
Irrespective of the policy objective, the rationales for future government interventions are likely to be 
restricted to those concerned with farm household income issues, and those related to correcting 
market failures in agricultural sector(OECD(2002)). And all policy instruments are recommended to 
be implemented in the way of avoiding production or consumption, and hence trade distortions. One 
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of the most promising policy instruments in this line would take the form of direct payments based on 
general budgetary payments, clearly targeted by the objectives, conditioned by strict implementation 
criteria, and limited by the scope and amount of payments(Anton and Cahill(2003)). Thus, the reform 
process is likely to incur big budget burden to the government. In this context, several structural 
factors which prevent a smooth policy reform exist in Korean agriculture. 
 
4.3.1 Limitation from Political Feasibility 
Rice monoculture in terms of resource allocation and income source has been a salient feature of 
Korean farming system. Almost all farmers have keen interests in rice. As a result, rice has become a 
kind of political good rather than a commercial good. Any trial of rice policy reform like government 
purchase price cut leads to serious protests from farmers. In general, the protests have seldom been 
overlooked by Korean National Assembly which has the right to finally determine the rice purchase 
price proposed by government. In the consideration of the skewed allocation of agricultural resources 
towards rice farming, without rice policy reform, total agricultural policy reform cannot be 
accomplished. Under the surge of cheap foreign fruits or vegetables, especially from China after its 
accession to WTO, several government efforts to convert rice farming to other crops cultivation have 
failed. 
 
4.3.2 Limitation from Too Large Farm Policy-targeting Group 
This limitation is related with policy effectiveness. As we have seen before, Korea has a very large 
farm employment. The share of agricultural employment in total civilian employment is near 10% 
that is much higher than the OECD average and is almost double the average of the advanced 
developed countries. With this large size of farmers and limited budgets, any policies based on budget 
payments would inevitably be diluted in effects, making it very difficult to convert MPS to direct 
payments. 
 
In addition to the large employment, the overflow of the old farmers causes additional problems.  
First of all, land mobility is highly restricted by the old farmers, which is partly responsible for high 
land price. Almost half the rice production cost is attributable to rent in Korea. Thus, the high land 
price is regarded as the most restrictive factor in achieving price competitiveness of rice industry. Old 
farmers who have very limited mobility between agriculture and other sectors cannot but stick to 
agriculture, resulting in very rigid land mobility. With this rigid land mobility, it is very difficult to 
improve the structure of small scale farming system and hence to improve efficiency and 
competitiveness, which becomes a reason for continuously calling for maintaining current support 
policy system.  
 
Table 10: Labor Hours Required for the Cultivation of Major Products (hours / 10 ares)  
  Rice Chinese Cabbage Red Pepper Onion Lettuce(protected farming) Apple 
1981 93(100%) 176(100%) 249(100%) 220(100%) 837(100%) 415(100%) 
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1995 35(37%) 140(80%) 243(98%) 193(87%) 724(87%) 334(81%) 
2001 28(30%) 101(57%) 205(82%) 136(62%) 688(82%) 196(47%) 
Source: Korea Rural Development Administration 
 
Second, they tend to stick to rice farming, which makes it difficult to convert rice farming to other 
items which have less political burden. The labor saving technology has progressed most prominently 
in rice farming than in any other farming. In this technological condition, the old farmers cannot help 
choosing rice farming with their limited labor forces. Over the last two decades, the labor saving 
technology has progressed in such a way as almost 70 per cent of labors required to cultivate rice 
could be saved, which is the most prominent progress compared with the technology progress in any 
other crops.            
 
4.3.3 Limitation from Inflexibility in Policy Options 
Increasing off-farm income could be an important policy option for government to adopt in the 
process of agricultural policy reform. As we saw earlier Korean farmers still derive most of their 
income from farming. Several government efforts to increase off-farm income since early 1980’s 
have not been rewarded satisfactorily. Currently the circumstances to enhance off-farm income are 
increasingly getting worse. The Korean rural areas do not have comparative advantages in terms of 
wage or land prices to attract outside firms which can serve as off-farm income sources compared 
with other neighboring countries like China. Currently, many small or medium sized firms tend to 
choose their plant site in foreign country rather than in Korean rural area. It is generally believed that 
Korea has lost opportunity of increasing off-farm income, and hence of securing useful policy option 
which can relieve the burden of government accompanying in the process of policy reform.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
From the early discussions, the most urgent precondition for Korea to reform current agricultural 
policy is to reduce the size of policy-targeting group, i.e. farmers. If Korea has manageable size of 
policy-targeting group the, difficulties resulting from political power of farmers and inflexibility in 
policy options will certainly be reduced while the effectiveness of policy will be increased. 
 
Considering that the large farm employment consists of old farmers of which the decrease rates are 
very stable and the mobility to other sectors is limited, it seems to take some time for Korea to have a 
reasonable size of farm employment comparable to other advanced developed countries so that some 
policies for structural adjustment may be implemented effectively. The only way to make it shorter is 
that government takes some policy initiatives like direct payments for early retirement, or resource 
transfers to more productive farmers. However, in the short run, with large number of farmers budget 
burden to government is unaffordable. That’s the main reason why Korean government demands 
 13
some grace period to reduce the number of farmers to a certain politically feasible level through 
securing developing country status in the multilateral trade negotiations. 
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